find that incumbents with high job approval ratings and those in party endorsement states are more likely to be unopposed in the primary. In contested primaries, experienced challengers and those who accept public funding are better able to match levels of spending by incumbents. The findings shed light on the dynamics of challenger emergence and the potential for public funding programs to make elections more competitive.
The role of money in elections is one of the most hotly debated issues in American politics. Most of the attention to campaign finance reform focuses on federal races. Research on the role of spending in gubernatorial elections is less developed than the vast literature on congressional races (Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Erickson and Palfrey 1998, 2000; Gerber 1998; Krasno 1988, 1990; Jacobson 1978 Jacobson , 1980 Jacobson , 1990 Squire 1991 ). Yet races for governor see more media coverage, higher candidate name recognition, and higher voter turnout than U.S. Senate races do (Boyd 1989; Squire and Fastnow 1994;  Tidmarch, Hyman, and Sorkin 1984) . Recent studies reflect increasing interest in the role of money in gubernatorial elections (Gross and Goidel 2001; Partin 1999 ), but there is still the need and opportunity for systematic research on the financing of these races.'
Due to the difficulty of gathering state data, research on the financing of gubernatorial campaigns is sparse (Malbin and Gais 1998) . One scholar tracks spending in gubernatorial races and makes the data available to others (Beyle 1986 (Beyle , 1990a (Beyle , 1990b (Beyle , 1991 (Beyle , 1996 . One study looks at the 'effects of spending on the vote for governor (Patterson 1982) , but save for a recent study of election-cycle spending differences in gubernatorial and Senate races (Gross and Goidel 2001) (Malbin and Gais 1998: 133-59 (Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner 1986; Green and Krasno 1988) . In some cases, prospective primary challengers are so intimidated by the strength of the incumbent and by internal party pressure that none of them dares to run. This "scare-off" effect is a major element of the incumbency advantage in congressional elections (Cox and Katz 1996; Squire 1989b Squire , 1991 (Menard 1995) . Since these coefficients have no direct interpretation, I also estimate the impact of each variable on the probability that the incumbent will be unopposed. Krasno 1988, 1990; Jacobson 1980 Jacobson , 1990 Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994 (Squire 1995) . First and foremost, scholars have seen challenger spending as a means to "buy" votes, leading to a debate over its efficiency versus incumbent spending (Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1990 ). Yet the challenger's ability to raise money to spend also reflects the strength of his or her candidacy By highlighting the factors that help or hinder challenger spending, this study continues to fill a gap in the literature (Gross and Goidel 2001 (Malbin and Gais 1998: 135-37 (Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox 1993; Squire 1989 The impact of public funding on challengers' share of spending is the most prominent finding in Table 2 . Challengers who accept public funding receive a huge financial boost as compared to challengers who reject public funding or lack access to it.10 Public money makes a run against the incumbent feasible for potentially strong challengers who lack the experience or organization to raise enough private money On the other hand, public funding acceptance by (Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox 1993; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994; Squire 1989a The interaction of spending and race margin is likely bi-directional. Spending buys name recognition and closes the gap on the incumbent, which attracts contributions and funds more spending. If state tracking polls were available, they would allow a dynamic analysis of the ebb and flow of spending and race closeness (Jacobson 1990: 342 (Hogan and Hamm 1998;  Kahn and Kenney 1999 (Squire 1989a) . I find that public funding programs favor challengers and can help equalize financial competition, but contribution limits have no effect (Gross and Goidel 2001) . Levels of public funding and spending limits need to be high enough to entice participation in the system. These findings suggest that reforms addressing the "catch-22" of challengers' low visibility and insufficient funding have the potential to make primary races more competitive.
APPENDIX
Historically, data-gathering problems have hindered research on campaign finance in gubernatorial races (Squire 1992 [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] All but NV 1989 NV -1992 All but MS 1985 MS -1988 All 
